Tuesday, Jan 28

Comments

After reading "Why DH is Nice," I can see how having a focus on methods over theories would make the field seem more calm. It's debating topics such as which coding language or program is best suited for rendering Plato's Symposium instead of debating whether or not it is a misogynist work. In regards to "Does DH Have to Answer Questions," I think that many of the tools that DH practitioners are looking for already exist in the business sphere. I'm not sure that DH really has the time "to play," as the article suggests. Especially in marketing and other business communications, AI and other software applications are being deployed to track, analyze, and predict audience behavior and sentiment. That being said, humanities subjects usually pose more abstract, nuanced problems than a supply chain optimization or balance sheet presents. However, I am concerned that erring too heavily on the "give us more time" side could prevent the field from advancing and discourage potential stakeholders. The digital timeline of innovation has sped up considerably from the time of the 18th century the article references.

I was struck by Felski's nudging a "hermeneutics of suspicion" back into methodological vogue, over critique, particularly in light of the rest of today's reading, which emphasized the value of refining a methodology over a theoretical approach (as it relates to DH). A "hermeneutics of suspicion" is less a concrete methodology than many of the DH methods we've started to look at in our projects and elsewhere (text analysis, arcGIS, digitization/archivization, etc.), but it seems valuable, as Felski notes, to push it forward as a (personal, maybe ideological?) methodology of practice in the humanities. Critique's claim over theory, Felski argues, promotes a feedback loop where "protestations of critique end up worshipping at the altar of critique" and context can be easily lost, since critique "presumes to understand the past better than the past understands itself" (Felski). A "hermeneutics of suspicion," though, as Felski sees it, seems to be more personal, more affective, more ideological than theoretical. A methodological "hermeneutics of suspicion" allows us to keep both ourselves and the objects we're working with/observing firmly situated in our respective contexts, as we engage with them. This softer, perhaps more human, approach is maybe what underlies the methodological focus of the digital humanities, is maybe what makes the "digital humanities...'nice'" (Scheinfeldt). 

After reading the article, "Why Digital Humanities is Nice", I was fairly surprised by the message about the field the author was trying to convey. It opens up an interesting debate about fields that are more method based. Does this truly make DH more friendly just because it is statistically agreeable? While it was slightly brushed on in the article, I found the information about DH being collaborative very helpful for my paper which is about how word processors became more collaborative as they improved with technological advances. It is helping me with seeing a correlation between the field and the product and how one has affected the other. Going back to the theory of the methods being why DH is nice, this is actually contradicted by the other piece "Where's the Beef". This debate about having the answer questions like a humanities field could lead to very difficult debates within digital humanities. The researchers on the different ends between technology and humanities most likely have different answers to this question which could affect the methods and goals of the research. The "Critique" article seems to take the route in the middle of the two arguments goes against methodology and pushes more to express personal opinions. They expressed that it should be up to a person's critique about the importance of answering questions. 

I really enjoyed the Feslki readings on critique because I think it clearly drew out some of the idiosyncracies of critique... without necessarily just critiquing critique. Feslki uses Latour's argument that "critique has been so successful because it assures us that we are always right" in order to articulate one of the reasons why critique has gained so much territory in the humanities and social sciences. Even in an undergraduate course it oftentimes feels like it is more applauded to critique a reading or find fault with it instead of agreeing or enjoying it for its merits. I also often experience a situation in which someone has provided staunch critique without hinting at an alternative way forward or explanation of the subject they've just torn apart. 

I think Scheinwedlt's argument about why DH is nice might corresponds with the potential for critique to produce negative sentiments within a department or field. If DH is more focused on methodology (as opposed to critique), individuals are not self-conscious or as judgemental as they might be knowing that critique is their colleague's go-to mindset.

 

The readings presented varying perspectives that are held within distinct fields like that of science or the humanities, which often include critiquing methods or theoretical approaches to arguments or critiques. The authors each take part in displaying the diversity of thought that is applied to topics, arguments, and questions in the digital humanities. The article about why digital humanities is considered the "nice" one in the realm of working fields, it is supported by the methodological approach that is valued and preferred in the digital humanities as it is described as more productive and efficient as it not only ends arguments more quickly but considers facts and practicality rather than giving preference to personal opinions that allow arguments to balloon. As we have learned from previous readings, humanists from all areas work in the digital humanities, including STEM-based individuals, and the dissection of differing thought processes explains the difficulty in answering questions in the humanities but emphasizes the need to have questions answered, using varying approaches to accomplish and work collaboratively towards a common goal rather than focusing on receiving credit or winning an argument based on theoretical evidence and support. The digital humanities are "nice" as sometimes inefficient and unbeneficial critique is strayed from while answering questions, building the field, using resources, and uniting work and thought are held to a higher degree.

In her article “Critique and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” Rita Felski hihglights the hermeneutics of suspicion as a possible alternative to critique, which, she argues, is pervaded by “anti-humanist rhetoric.” Felski argues for the value of the hermeneutics of suspicion when she points out that the phrase: “has the singular advantage of allowing us to by-pass the exceptionalist tendencies of critique: its presumption that whatever is not critique can only be assigned to the ignominious state of the uncritical.” In Tom Scheinfeldt’s, “Where’s the Beef? Does Digital Humanities Have to Answer Questions?,” he points out that digital humanities work is often criticized for not coming up with new arguments and not being necessary to answer many humanities questions. He asserts that DH should not yet have to produce new arguments or answer questions because it is still relatively new and growing. Yet, the way Felski presents the “hermeneutics of suspicion” seems like a possible solution to this criticism that is so often leveraged at digital humanities projects. Instead of appearing uncritical in the tradition of critique, under the hermeneutics of suspicion tradition, digital humanities work is a valid academic endeavor because it brings to the fore new ways of knowing and looking for truth.   

Felski's "Critique and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion" critically engaged with the methods of (primarily literary and cultural) critique, especially as practiced by scholars in the poststructuralist tradition. (That a poststructuralist tradition could exist is part of Felski’s critique.) I interpret ones Felski’s main critiques to be that critique itself has coalesced into a set of approaches and attitudes that have attained hegemonic or orthodox status in the academy, precluding self-critique. Relatedly, Felski argues that critique as practiced lacks a sense of discovery, or even play (“game-like sparring with the text”) present in other hermeneutical traditions. Felski believes that the analytical and contextual insights poststructuralist critique offers need not be strictly separate from more interpretive approaches to humanities scholarship.

Felski’s arguments in favor of discovery and play in humanities scholarship resonate with the two brief blog posts from Scheinfeldt. Making an analogy to natural sciences, where formalization and theory have often followed from discovery, Scheinfeldt argues that digital humanities is in a discovery phase. The emphasis on methods in DH is part of this discovery phase. Rushing towards a formal theory of digital humanities might stifle discovery, maybe even hinder the growth of the field. I tend to share Scheinfeldt’s outlook about the importance of discovery, relative to formalization and analysis. I think theory has a tendency to become prescriptive rather than descriptive, which is similar to how Felski characterizes the state of critique as scholarship.

 

I found Felski's writing on the intellectual field of critique to be very enlightening and thought-provoking. Criticism plays a large role in the field of humanities, given that nearly every work produced is a bias representation of the author's mind resulting from their unique experiences. So when someone produces something, there will always be the presence of alternate opinions that do not convene exactly with the author's message. 

As Felski points out, often criticism is less of an outright condemnation, and rather a refutation of the presumptions that the the material is based on. 

The one aspect I did want to push back on or at least question is the pillar: "Critique does not tolerate rivals." The idea that a criticism of a work cannot itself be criticized seems pretty ironic to me. Because we are assuming that every person's opinion, be it critical or supportive, is a result of his/her/their own personal experience. That being said, even someone's critique can come from a bias and incorrectly informed perspective. If critique does not tolerate rivals, then what is there to be said about the massive critique of Socialism that's taken place in Capitalist America for the past century, even though many countries have functioning socialist institutions in place in their government. All I'm saying is that criticism itself  can and should be able to tolerate rival opinion.

While reading Felski’s piece, I was intrigued by the compare/contrast between “critique” and “the hermeneutics of suspicion,” especially since I had not heard of the latter term until now. I found myself really connecting with Felski’s critique on “critique” and her breakdown of its characteristics—negative, secondary, intellectual, coming from below, and not tolerating rivals. I think she offered some great discussion on what critiquing something may actually mean and how there may be other means of interpreting things without necessarily critiquing them.

Furthermore, I really enjoyed reading both of Scheinfeldt’s works emphasizing what it means to be involved with digital humanities. Both works emphasized the methodologies involved in the digital humanities, and how these methodologies can build upon old arguments and questions—not everything has to be answered immediately. Additionally, these methodologies encourage collaboration and “niceness” since, despite most things having some inherent argument or theory, most digital humanists want to work through the “how” of the project. I think Scheinfeldt mentions some interesting things to truly think about, especially regarding what’s really involved within digital humanities.

I very much enjoyed both of Scheinfeldt's articles because I found them to be relevant, concise, approachable, and agreeable. In "Where’s the Beef? Does Digital Humanities Have to Answer Questions?", Scheinfeldt explores the question of the "usefulness" of digital humanities, i.e. the humanistic arguments made by the field. As someone coming from a science background, I agree with Scheinfeldt's assertion that the field of DH does not have an obligation to be immediately useful or solve already existing questions. I personally think that much can be learned through aimless exploration because it leads us to places that we otherwise might not go. The questions can come later, after we get a glimpse of the potential answers.

In "Why Digital Humanities Is 'Nice'", Scheinfeldt discusses his experience in the digital humanities field with how nice everybody is. This got me thinking about different fields, and I decided that for me, the sciences are more "friendly" than the humanities. This may seem counterintuitive, since I'm sure many people would consider the sciences to be the more "competitive" of the disciplines. This is an understandable outlook—after all, STEM schools and programs have a reputation of being cutthroat, while liberal arts programs are seen as more friendly or laid back. Still, I find the sciences (in my personal opinion, at least) to be more welcoming because of their reliance on collaboration. If every scientist had to come along and rediscover gravity, and the atom, and relativity, then they would never get anywhere. Science is inherently built upon the work of those who came before, so there is a general understanding that nobody's work is definitive and that everyone in the discipline is working towards the same goal of understanding more about the universe. In contrast, I have found that the humanities are often more about people attempting to explain why their own, original, unique theory is correct and everybody else's ideas are wrong. This ties into Scheinfeldt's explanation, which is that DH has a focus on methodology (a characteristic of most sciences) rather than theory, which is the norm in the humanities. I found that this related to my own thoughts, since a methodological focus is concerned with using tools (often built by somebody else) to discover new things or explain existing questions, while humanistic theories are often wholly unique and diametrically opposed to one another, leading to conflict.

The blog post about why Digital Humanities is so “nice” caught my attention perhaps the most of all the readings because it was something that rang true even if I had never consciously thought about it. The point about DH being collaborative made sense—every time I’ve ever heard a definition about DH, “collaboration” is included. On top of that, DH is one of the few areas where ideas and methodologies are shared across areas of study as a core concept. After reading the author’s argument, it felt like taking a subconscious thought and pulling it to my consciousness without any struggle. 

Another concept that I found particularly moving was the discussion about not if DH has to make arguments, but when. It makes sense, given the humanities foundation of DH, that arguments are expected out of DH. I suppose when I think of this, I consider everything DH does to be an argument. DH essentially says, “if we take this thing—pre-existing or a concept—and combine these technologies from these fields to make it, then it will be more effective than what currently exists (which may be nothing at all).” In that way, DH is all about making an argument for efficiency and effectiveness. 

 

The terminology deconstructed in these three articles are intriguing. I’ve never heard of the term “hermeneutics of suspicion” so it was interesting to even learn the nuanced relationship it has to “critique.” In general it seems that Felski draws strong distinctions between these two terms, such as being more distant than close or guarded versus open to analyzing reading. To think of “critique” as providing self-reflexive thinking and the method of thought that has manifested more prominently somewhat seems contradictory since reading suspiciously is a “less prejudicial term, it opens up a larger history of suspicious readings” thus, leaving more to self-reflect about. I also enjoyed the Where’s the Beef article because I think it’s important to establish that digital humanities does use methodical and theoretical work like the sciences and uses tools. It makes me excited to see what the future may hold within the digital humanities if all we need is time to develop tools.It’s interesting to note the “niceness” or digital humanities, especially because I was always taught to be wary of what I put on the internet, and to be wary of cyberbullying. In middle / high school especially it was grained in us that that online interfaces took on “pretend” faces, so people could be potentially more mean than they would in real life / how we shouldn’t engage in that behavior. I appreciate that Scheinfeldt argues that the reason DH is nice is because of the methodological approach as well.

I thought Tom Scheinfeldt’s comparison of methodological and theoretical debates in “Why Digital Humanities Is ‘Nice’” was very interesting. I agree that arguments of method are able to reach a more succinct conclusion because of the more finite solutions available, whereas arguments of theory could reach a point of secular logic and persist infinitely. For this reason, I give digital humanities and these methodological fields props, but there is something to be said about the importance of theory. Sometimes “nice” doesn’t cut it. Theory breeds innovation that can’t always be reached with a methodological approach. Scheinfeldt’s other piece, “Where’s the Beef?”, explores a similar idea to the one I previously mentioned. Because the digital humanities are so new, the criticisms of it not being necessarily producing new ideas is fair. However, through digital projects like the ones we are doing, the library of digital humanities expands to hopefully deter future criticisms. As for Felski's "Critique and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion", I thought the point of criticism was important. Criticism, while not necessarily “nice”, does function to push boundaries and inspire when done correctly.

 

Rita Felski’s “Critique and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion” aims to dissect the buzzwords of literary scholarship as well as the humanities at large. This is an extremely important exercise, as defining terms is absolutely essential to effective scholarship.  However, this piece also is evidence of academia’s opaqueness, in which it makes itself inaccessible by hiding behind its terminology. While this article aims to break down critique into five components it remains largely inaccessible even to those from other humanistic disciplines trying to engage in shared conversations about post-structuralism and critique.

Tom Scheinfeldt’s blog post illuminates a question that is frequently posed to me as someone who wants to engage in digital humanities. My advisor often asks, “What does it add? What is its argument?” This tension between its ability to provoke and its ability to answer questions, has put digital humanities in a very tenuous position. While Scheinfeldt questions whether digital humanities must make arguments now, or needs time to experiment, I would argue that academia and its strict traditions are certainly making it hard to wait. In his second post, “Why Digital Humanities is Nice,” Schienfeldt investigates the theory between theory and method and its impact on collegiality and digital humanities. His argument is quite convincing that a focus on method instead of theory offers the opportunity to actually answer questions and make arguments as opposed to inspire untenable debate.  

Learning the history of the hermeneutics of suspicion was really fascinating. I was familiar with the term from previous English courses, but I was unaware of the link the type of study shared with Freud and other people of his time. The author did an excellent job explaining what hermeneutics of suspicion is and is not - considering how complex of an idea it is. Additionally, the author's discussion of critique was intriguing and thought-provoking - I had not really sat down and considered how critique must always be negative and secondary. In retrospect, this seems obvious, but without really sitting with it I had not previously considered this idea fully. I additionally enjoyed the blog post about how DH is a friendly discipline. The author's explanation of removing the focus from theory to methods makes a lot of sense. If there is a concrete answer, it is much easier to resolve a disagreement within a field. 

Reading the "Where's the Beef? Does Digital Humanities Have to Answer Questions?" I was really interested on the comparison of Digital Humanities with Robert Hooke and Science. I understood the development of DH; however, thinking of it as science developing tools and having experiments. I enjoyed reading it with the narrative of science development to compare to. In the reading of "Why DH is "Nice"", I have correlated DH "nice" nature as described in the article due to the interdisciplinary of DH. I'm currently taking an American Studies class which has no respect for disciplines which I believe DH does as well. DH using different methodologies from different areas is how it correlates to American Studies. They're both "still young"  and being able to pull from different disciplines. I think the reading was very accurate and I enjoyed being able to compare DH to science as well as American Studies.